Answer set programming is a prominent declarative programming paradigm used in formulating combinatorial search problems and implementing distinct knowledge representation formalisms. It is common that several related and yet substantially different answer set programs exist for a given problem. Sometimes these encodings may display significantly different performance. Uncovering precise formal links between these programs is often important and yet far from trivial. This paper claims the correctness of a number of interesting program rewritings.
Introduction
Answer set programming (ASP) is a prominent knowledge representation paradigm with roots in logic programming (Brewka et al. 2011) . It is frequently used for addressing combinatorial search problems. It has also been used to provide implementations and/or translational semantics to other knowledge representation formalisms such as action languages including languages B (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1998, Section 5) , C , BC , C + (Giunchiglia et al. 2004; Babb and Lee 2013) , an A L (Gelfond and Kahl 2014, Section 8) .
In answer set programming, a given computational problem is represented by a declarative program, also called a problem encoding, that describes the properties of a solution to the problem. Then, an answer set solver is used to generate answer sets for the program. These answer sets correspond to solutions to the original problem. As answer set programming evolves, new language features come to life providing means to reformulations of original problem encodings. Such new formulations often prove to be more intuitive and/or more concise and/or more efficient. Similarly, when a software engineer tackles a problem domain by means of answer set programming it is a common practice to first develop a/some solution to a problem and then rewrite this solution iteratively using such techniques, for example, as projection to gain a better performing encoding (Buddenhagen and Lierler 2015) . These common processes bring a scientific question to light: what are the formal means to argue the correctness of renewed formulations of the original encodings to problems. In other words, under assumption that the original encoding to a problem is correct how can we argue that a related and yet different encoding is also correct.
It has been long recognized that studying various notions of equivalence between programs under the answer set semantics is of crucial importance. Researchers proposed and studied strong equivalence (Lifschitz et al. 2001; Lifschitz et al. 2007 ), uniform equivalence (Eiter and Fink 2003) , relativized strong and uniform equivalences (Woltran 2004) . Another related approach is the study of forgetting (Leite 2017) . Also, equivalences relative to specified signatures were considered (Erdogan and Lifschitz 2004; Eiter et al. 2005; Woltran 2008; Harrison and Lierler 2016) . In most of the cases the programs considered for studying the distinct forms of equivalence are propositional. Works by , , Lifschitz et al. (2007) , Oetsch and Tompits (2008) , Pearce and Valverde (2012) , and Harrison and Lierler (2016) are exceptions. These authors consider programs with variables (or, first-order programs) . It is first-order programs that ASP knowledge engineers develop. Thus, theories on equivalence between programs with variables are especially important as they can lead to more direct arguments about properties of programs used in practice.
In this paper we show how concepts of strong equivalence and and so called conservative extension are of use in illustrating that two programs over different signatures and with significantly different structure are "essentially the same" in a sense that they capture solutions to the same problem. The paper has two parts. In the first part we consider propositional programs. In the second part, we move to the programs with variables. These parts can be studied separately. The first one is appropriate for researchers who are not yet deeply familiar with answer set programming theory and are interested in learning formal details. The second part is geared towards answer set programming practitioners providing them with theoretical grounds and tools to assist them in program analysis and formal claims about the developed encodings and their relations. In both of these parts we utilize running examples stemming from the literature. For instance, for the case of propositional programs we study two distinct ASP formalizations of action language C . In the case of first-order programs, we study two distinct formalizations of planning modules for action language A L . In both cases we identify interesting results. We now provide a detailed outline for the tow parts of the paper.
Outline of the first part: propositional programs We start by presenting the original formalization of action language C in the language of logic programs under answer set semantics . Specifically, proposed a translation from an action description D in C to a logic program l p T (D) so that the answer sets of this program capture all the "histories" of length T in the transition system specified by D. Since that original work, languages of answer set programming have incorporated new features such as, for instance, choice rules. At present, these are commonly used by the practitioners of ASP. It is easy to imagine that in a modern formalization of action language C , given a system description D a resulting program will be different from the original l p T (D). In fact, Babb and Lee (2013) present a translation of an action language C + (note how C is said to be the immediate predecessor of C + (Giunchiglia et al. 2004, Section 7. 3)) that utilizes modern language features such as choice rules. Here, we present this translation for the case of C . In particular, we restrict the language of C + to boolean, or twovalued, fluents (in general, C + permits multivalued fluents). We call this translation simp T (D) . Although, l p T (D) and simp T (D) share a lot in common they are substantially different. To begin with, the signatures of these programs are not identical. Also, simp T (D) utilizes choice rules. The programs l p T (D) and simp T (D) are different enough that it is not immediately obvious that their answer sets capture the same entities. There are two ways to argue that the program simp T (D) is "essentially the same" as program l p T (D) : to illustrate that the answer sets of simp T (D) capture all the "histories" of length T in the transition system specified by D by relying 2. on the properties of programs l p T (D) and simp T (D) that establish a one-to-one correspondence between their answer sets.
Here we take the second way into consideration. We illustrate how the concepts of strong equivalence and conservative extension together with formal results previously discovered about these prove to be of essence in this argument. Thus, we showcase a proof technique for arguing on the correctness of a logic program. This proof technique assumes the existence of a "gold standard" logic program formalizing a problem at hand, in a sense that this gold standard is trusted to produce correct results. It is a common practice in development of answer set programming solutions to obtain a final formalization of a problem by first producing such a gold standard program and then applying a number of rewriting procedures to that program to enhance its performance. The benefits of the proposed method are twofold. First, this methodology can be used by software engineers during a formal analysis of their solutions. Second, we trust that this methodology paves a way for a general framework for arguing correctness of common program rewritings so that they can be automated for the gain of performance. This is a question for investigation in the future.
Our work, which illustrates that logic programs l p T (D) and simp T (D) are essentially the same, also uncovers a precise formal link between the action description languages C and C +. Although, the authors of C + claimed that C is an immediate predecessor of C +, the exact formal link between the two languages has not been stated, to the best of our knowledge. Thus, prior one could view C + as a generalization of C only informally alluding to the fact that C + allows the same intuitive interpretation of syntactic expressions of C , but generalizes these to allow multivalued fluents in place of boolean ones. These languages share the same syntactic constructs such as, for example, a dynamic law of the form
that we intuitively read as after the concurrent execution of actions a 1 . . . a n the fluent expression f 0 holds in case if fluents expressions f 1 . . . f m were the case at the time when aforementioned actions took place. Both languages provide interpretations for such expressions that meet our intuitions of this informal reading. Yet, if one studies the semantics of these languages it is not trivial to establish a specific formal link between them. For example, the semantics of C + relies on the concepts of causal theories (Giunchiglia et al. 2004 ). The semantics of C makes no reference to these theories. Here we recall the translations of C and C + to logic programs, whose answer sets correspond to their key semantic objects. We then state the precise relation between the two by means of relating the relevant translations. In conclusion, C + can be viewed as a true generalization of the language C to the case of multi-valued fluents.
Detailed outline of the second part: programs with variables On the one hand, this part of the paper can be seen as a continuation of work by , where we consider common program rewritings using a more complex dialect of logic programs. On the other hand, it grounds the concept of program's synonymity studied by Pearce and Valverde (2012) in a number of practical examples. Namely, we illustrate how formal results on strong equivalence developed earlier and in this work help us to construct precise claims about programs in practice.
In this part of the paper, we systematically study some common rewritings on first-order programs utilized by ASP practitioners. As a running and motivating example that grounds general theoretical presentation of this work into specific context, we consider two formalizations of a planning module given in (Gelfond and Kahl 2014, Section 9) . Namely, 1. a Plan-choice formalization that utilizes choice rules and aggregate expressions, 2. a Plan-disj formalization that utilizes disjunctive rules. Such a planning module is meant to be augmented with an ASP representation of a dynamic system description expressed in action language A L . Gelfond and Kahl (2014) formally state in Proposition 9.1.1 that the answer sets of program Plan-disj augmented with a given system description encode all the "histories/plans" of a specified length in the transition system captured by the system description. Although both Plan-choice and Plan-disj programs intuitively encode the same knowledge the exact connection between them is not immediate. In fact, these programs • do not share the same signature, and • use distinct syntactic constructs such as choice, disjunction, aggregates in the specification of a problem. Here, we establish a one-to-one correspondence between the answer sets of these programs using their properties. Thus, the aforementioned formal claim about Plan-disj translates into the same claim for Plan-choice. It is due to remark that although Gelfond and Kahl (2014) use the word "module" when encoding a planning domain, they utilize this term only informally to refer to a collection of rules responsible for formalizing "planning".
Here we use a dialect of ASP language called RASPL-1 (Lee et al. 2008) . Notably, this language combines choice, aggregate, and disjunction constructs. Its semantics is given in terms of the SM operator, which exemplifies the approach to the semantics of first-order programs that bypasses grounding. Relying on SM-based semantics allows us to refer to earlier work that study the formal properties of first-order programs (Ferraris et al. 2011; Ferraris et al. 2009 ) using this operator. We state a sequence of formal results on programs rewritings and/or programs' properties. Some discussed rewritings are well known and frequently used in practice. Often, their correctness is an immediate consequence of well known properties about logic programs (e.g., relation between intuitionistically provable first-order formulas and strongly equivalent programs viewed as such formulas). Other discussed rewritings are far less straightforward and require elaborations on previous theoretical findings about the operator SM. It is well known that propositional head-cycle-free disjunctive programs (Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter 1994) can be rewritten to nondisjunctive programs by means of simple syntactic transformation. Here we not only generalize this result to the case of first-order programs, but also illustrate that at times we can remove disjunction from parts of a program even though the program is not head-cycle-free. This result is relevant to local shifting and component-wise shifting discussed in and (Janhunen et al. 2007 ), respectively. We also generalize so called Completion Lemma and Lemma on Explicit Definitions stated in (Ferraris 2005; Ferraris and Lifschitz 2005) for the case of propositional theories and propositional logic programs. These generalizations are applicable to first-order programs.
This part of the paper is a substantially extended version of the paper presented at PADL 2019 (Lierler 2019) . Summary. We view this paper as an important step towards bringing theories about program's equivalence to providing practical solutions in the realm of ASP as it is used by knowledge engineers. A portfolio of formal results on program rewritings stated in this paper can serve as a solid theoretical basis for • a portfolio of program rewritings;
• a software system that may automatically produce new variants of logic programs (some of these encodings will often exhibit better performance) by utilizing studied rewritings; • a proof technique for arguing the correctness of a logic program. This proof technique as-sumes the existence of a "gold standard" logic program formalizing a problem at hand, in a sense that this gold standard is trusted to produce correct results. A proper portfolio of known program rewritings and their properties equips ASP practitioners with powerful tools to argue that another encoding is essentially the same to the gold standard. Paper Outline. The paper is structured as follows. We start by reviewing action language C in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 presents the concepts of (i) a propositional logic program, (ii) strong equivalence between propositional logic programs, and (iii) a propositional logic program being a conservative extension of another one. We also review a weak natural deduction system that is later used to formally argue the strong equivalence between groups of logic rules. Section 2.3 introduces a rewriting technique frequently used by ASP developers when a new auxiliary proposition is introduced in order to denote a conjunction of other propositions. Then these conjunctions are safely renamed by the auxiliary atom. We refer to this process as explicit definition rewriting and illustrate its correctness. In Section 2.4, we present an original, or gold standard, translation of language C to a logic program. Section 2.5 states a modern formalization stemming from the translation of a syntactically restricted C +. At last, in Section 2.6 we showcase how we can argue on the correctness of a modern formalization by illustrating the formal relation between the original and modern translations of language C . We utilize reasoning by weak natural deduction and a formal result on explicit definition rewriting in this illustration.
We start the second part of the paper by presenting the Plan-choice and Plan-disj programs at the onset of Section 3. We then introduce a logic program language called RASPL-1 in Section 3.2. The semantics of this language is given in terms of the SM operator in Section 3.2.2. In Section 3.2.3, we review the concept of strong equivalence for first order programs. Section 3.3 is devoted to a sequence of formal results on program's rewritings. In conclusion, in Section 3.4 we review a frequently used rewriting technique called projection that often translates into better performing encodings. We illustrate the utility of the presented theoretical results as they can be used to argue the correctness of distinct versions of projection.
Propositional Programs

Review of Action Language C
This review of action language C follows .
We consider a set σ of propositional symbols partitioned into the fluent names σ f l and the elementary action names σ act . An action is an interpretation of σ act . Here we only consider what call definite action descriptions so that we only define this special class of C action descriptions.
Syntactically, a C action description is a set of static and dynamic laws. Static laws are of the form
and dynamic laws are of the form
where • l 0 is either a literal over σ f l or the symbol ⊥,
is a literal in σ , and
• conjunctions l 1 ∧ · · · ∧ l m and l m+1 ∧ · · · ∧ l n are possibly empty and understood as ⊤ in this case. In both laws, the literal l 0 is called the head.
Semantically, an action description defines a graph or a transition system. We call nodes of this graph states and directed edges transitions. We now define these concepts precisely. Consider an action description D. A state is an interpretation of σ f l that satisfies implication
for every static law (1) 
A transition s, a, s ′ is causally explained by D if its resulting state s ′ is the set of literals caused in this transition.
The transition system described by an action description D is the directed graph, which has the states of D as nodes, and which includes an edge from state s to state s ′ labeled a for every transition s, a, s ′ that is causally explained by D.
We now present an example from that formalizes the effects of putting an object in water. We use this domain as a running example. It uses the fluent names inWater and wet and the elementary action name putInnWater. In the notation introduced in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1998, Section 6) 
We depict this transition system in Figure 1 . 
Traditional Logic Programs and their Equivalences
A (traditional logic) program is a finite set of rules of the form
, where each a 0 is an atom or ⊥ and each
The expression containing atoms a 1 through a n is called the body of the rule. Atom a 0 is called a head.
We define the answer sets of a traditional program Π following . We say that a program is basic, when it does not contain connective not. In other words a basic program consists of the rules of the form
where each a 0 is an atom or ⊥ and each a i (1 ≤ i ≤ l) is an atom, ⊤, or ⊥. We say that a set X of atoms satisfies rule (5) if it satisfies the implication
We say that a set X of atoms is an answer set of a basic program Π if X is a minimal set among sets satisfying all rules of Π.
A reduct of a program Π with respect to a set X of atoms, denoted by Π X , is constructed as follows. For each rule (4) in Π 1. when not not a i (m + 1 ≤ i ≤ n) is such that a i ∈ X, replace this expression with ⊤, otherwise replace it with ⊥, 2. when not a i (l + 1 ≤ i ≤ m) is such that a i ∈ X, replace this expression with ⊥, otherwise replace it with ⊤.
It is easy to see that a reduct of a program forms a basic program. We say that a set X of atoms is an answer set of a traditional program if it is an answer set for the reduct Π X . In the later part of the paper we present the definition of an answer set for programs with variables by means of operator SM (Ferraris et al. 2011 ). Ferraris et al. (2011 show in which sense SM operator captures the semantics of answer sets presented here.
According to (Ferraris and Lifschitz 2005) and (Ferraris 2005) , rules of the form (4) are sufficient to capture the meaning of the choice rule construct commonly used in answer set programming. For instance, the choice rule {p} ← q is understood as the rule
We use choice rule notation in the sequel.
Strong Equivalence and "Weak" Natural Deduction
Traditional programs Π 1 and Π 2 are strongly equivalent (Lifschitz et al. 2001 ) when for every program Π, programs Π 1 ∪ Π and Π 2 ∪ Π have the same answer sets. In addition to introducing the strong equivalence, Lifschitz et al. (2001) also illustrated that traditional programs can be associated with the propositional formulas and a question whether the programs are strongly equivalent can be turned into a question whether the respective propositional formulas are equivalent in the logic of here-and-there (HT-logic), an intermediate logic between classical and intuitionistic one.
We follow the steps of (Lifschitz et al. 2001 ) and identify a rule (4) with the propositional formula Lifschitz et al. (2001) state that every formula provable in the natural deduction system, where the axiom of the law of the excluded middle (F ∨¬F) is replaced by the weak law of the excluded middle (¬F ∨ ¬¬F), is a theorem of HT. We call this system weak natural deduction system. Since we use this observation in providing formal arguments, we review the weak natural deduction system next. We denote this system by N. Its review follows the lines of (Lifschitz 2016) to a large extent. For another reference to natural deductions system we refer the reader to . We note that Mints (2010) introduced an alternative sequent calculus for logic of HT that was further generalized to first-order case.
A sequent is an expression of the form
("F under assumptions G "), where F is a propositional formula that allows connectives
and G is a finite set of formulas. If G is written as {G 1 , . . . , G n }, we drop the braces and write (7) as G 1 , . . . , G n ⇒ F. Intuitively, this sequent is understood as the formula In the list of inference rules presented in Figure 2 , G , ∆, Σ are finite sets of formulas, and F, G, H are formulas. The inference rules of N except for the two rules at the last row are classified into introduction rules (·I) and elimination rules (·E); the exceptions are the contradiction rule (C) and the weakening rule (W ). A proof/derivation is a list of sequents S 1 , . . . , S n such that each S i is either an axiom or can be derived from some of the sequents in S 1 , . . . , S i−1 by one of the inference rules. To prove a sequent S means to find a proof with the last sequent S. To prove a formula F means to prove the sequent ⇒ F.
The De Morgan's law
is provable intuitionistically (where we understand formula
is such that its one half is provable intuitionistically, while the other one is provable in HT (thus, formulas ¬(F ∧ G) and ¬F ∨ ¬G are equivalent in HT-logic). We illustrate the latter fact in Figure 3 using system N. In other words, we prove sequent
It is convenient to introduce abbreviations for the assumptions used in the proofs so that A 1 abbreviates assumption ¬(F ∧ G) in Figure 3 . It is easy to show that the propositional formulas F → ⊥ and ¬F are equivalent using N, so that in the sequel we often identify rules of the form
with the propositional formula
Conservative Extensions
Harrison and Lierler (2016) defined the notion of a conservative extension for the case of logic programs. Similarly to strong equivalence, it attempts to capture the conditions under which we can rewrite parts of the program and yet guarantee that the resulting program is not different in an essential way from the original one. Conservative extensions allow us to reason about rewritings even when the rules in question have different signatures. For a program Π, by atoms(Π) we denote the set of atoms occurring in Π. Let Π and Π ′ be programs such that atoms(Π) ⊆ atoms(Π ′ ). We say that program Π ′ is a conservative extension of Π if X → X ∩ atoms(Π) is a 1-1 correspondence between the answer sets of Π ′ and the answer sets of Π. For instance, program
is a conservative extension of program containing a single choice rule {p}.
Furthermore, given program Π such that (i) it contains rule {p} and (ii) q ∈ atoms(Π), a program constructed from Π by replacing {p} with (8) is a conservative extension of Π.
On Explicit Definition Rewriting
We now turn our attention to a common rewriting technique based on explicit definitions and illustrate its correctness. This technique introduces an auxiliary proposition in order to denote a conjunction of other propositions. Then these conjunctions are safely renamed by the auxiliary atom in the remainder of the program. We call a formula basic conjunction when it is of the form
where each a i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is an atom, ⊤, or ⊥. For example, the body of any rule in a traditional program is a basic conjunction. Let Π be a program, Q be a set of atoms that do not occur in Π. For an atom q ∈ Q, let de f (q) denote a basic conjunction (9) where a i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in atoms(Π). We say that de f (q) is an explicit definition of q in terms of Π. By de f (Q) we denote a set of formulas de f (q) for each atom q ∈ Q. We assume that all these formulas are distinct. Program Π[Q, de f (Q)] is constructed from Π as follows:
• all occurrences of all formulas de f (q) from de f (Q) in some body of Π are replaced by respective q,
• for every atom q ∈ Q a rule of the form
is added to the program. For instance, let Π be a program
The proposition below supports the fact that the latter program is a conservative extension of the former.
Proposition 1
Let Π be a program, Q be a set of atoms that do not occur in Π, and de f (Q) be a set composed of explicit definitions for each element in Q in terms of
To prove Proposition 1 several earlier results from the literature are of use.
Proposition 2 (Replacement Theorem I in (Mints 2000), Section 2.8)
If F is a formula containing a subformula G and F ′ is the result of replacing that subformula by
To rely on formal results stated earlier in the literature, we now consider the case of programs that are more general than traditional logic programs. We call such programs definitional. In other words, traditional programs are their special case. A definitional program consists of rules of the form (6) (recall that we identify rule (4) with the propositional formula (6)) and rules of the form a → F, where a is an atom and F is a basic conjunction. If a program contains two rules F → a and a → F we abbreviate that by a single expression F ↔ a. A definitional program is a special case of propositional theories presented in (Ferraris 2005) . We understand the notion of answer sets for such programs as presented in that work. Ferraris (2005, Section 2) illustrates that in application to any traditional program the definition from , presented here, and their definition are equivalent.
We now restate the results that immediately follow from Lemma on Explicit Definitions and Completion Lemma presented in (Ferraris 2005) for the case of definitional programs.
Proposition 3 (Proposition 4 (Ferraris 2005))
Let Π be a definitional program and Q be a set of atoms that do not occur in Π. For each q ∈ Q, let De f (q) be a basic conjunction that does not contain any atom in Q. Then, X → X \ Q is a 1-1 correspondence between the answer sets if Π ∪ {De f (q) → q | q ∈ Q} and the answer sets of Π.
Proposition 4 (Proposition 5 (Ferraris 2005))
Let Π be a definitional program and Q be a set of atoms that do not occur in Π. For each q ∈ Q, let De f (q) be a basic conjunction that does not contain any atom in Q. Then, Π ∪ {De f (q) → q | q ∈ Q} and Π ∪ {De f (q) ↔ q | q ∈ Q} have the answer sets of Π.
Proof of Proposition 1
By Π ′ we denote a program constructed from Π by adding a rule de f (q) → q for every atom q ∈ Q. By Proposition 3, Π ′ is a conservative extension of Π. By Proposition 4, traditional program Π ′ has the same answer sets as the definitional program Π ′′ constructed from Π ′ by replacing a rule de f (q) → q with a rule de f (q) ↔ q . Similarly, traditional program Π[Q, de f (Q)] has the same answer sets as the definitional program Π[Q, de f (Q)] ′ constructed from it by replacing a rule de f (q) → q with a rule de f (q) ↔ q. By Replacement Theorem I, Π ′′ and Π[Q, de f (Q)] ′ are strongly equivalent.
Review of Basic Translation
Let D be an action description. defined a translation from action description D to a logic program l p T (D) parametrized with a positive integer T that intuitively represents a time horizon. The remarkable property of logic program l p T (D) that its answer sets correspond to "histories" -path of length T in the transition system described by D.
Recall that by σ f l we denote fluent names of D and by σ act we denote elementary action names of D. Let us construct "complementary" vocabularies to σ f l and σ act as follows The language of l p T (D) has atoms of four kinds:
1. fluent atoms-the fluent names of σ f l followed by (t) where t = 0, . . . , T , 2. action atoms-the action names of σ act followed by (t) where t = 0, . . . , T − 1, 3. complement fluent atoms-the elements of -σ f l followed by (t) where t = 0, . . . , T , 4. complement action atoms-the elements of -σ act followed by (t) where t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Program l p T (D) consists of the following rules:
1. for every atom a that is a fluent or action atom of the language of l p T (D)
and
2. for every static law (1) in D, the rules
for all t = 0, . . . , T (we understand l 0 (t) as ⊥ if l 0 is ⊥), 3. for every dynamic law (2) in D, the rules
for all fluent names a in σ f l and 5. for every atom a that is an action atom of the language of l p T (D) the rules -a ← not a a ← not -a.
Proposition 5 (Proposition 1 in (Lifschitz and Turner 1999))
For a set X of atoms, X is an answer set for l p T (D) if and only if it has the form
We note that presented l p T translation and Proposition 1 using both default negation not and classical negation ¬ in the program. Yet, classical negation can always be eliminated from a program by means of auxiliary atoms and additional constraints as it is done here. In particular, auxiliary atoms have the form -a(i) (where -a(i) intuitively stands for literal ¬a(i)), while the additional constraints have the form (10).
The translation of C action description (3) consists of all rules of the form
Simplified Modern Translation
As in the previous section, let D be an action description and T a positive integer. In this section we define a translation from action description D to a logic program simp T (D) inspired by l p T (D) and the advances in answer set programming languages. The main property of logic program simp T (D) is as in case of l p T (D) that its answer sets correspond to "histories" captured by the transition system described by D. This translation is a special case of a translation by (Babb and Lee 2013) for an action language C + that is limited to two-valued fluents. The language of simp T (D) has atoms of three kinds that coincide with the three first groups (1-3) of atoms identified in the language of l p T (D).
For a literal l, we define l = not a if l is a literal of the form ¬a, where a ∈ σ act l otherwise
Program simp T (D) consists of the following rules:
1. for every fluent atom a the rules of the form (10) and (11), 2. for every static law (1) in D, simp T (D) contains the rules of the form
for all t = 0, . . . , T 2 , 3. for every dynamic law (2) in D, the rules
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, 2 Babb and Lee (2013) allow rules with arbitrary formulas in their bodies so that in place of (15) they consider rule
). Yet, it is well known that such a rule is strongly equivalent to (15). Furthermore, more answer set solvers allow rules of the form (15) than more general rules considered in (Babb and Lee 2013). 4. the rules {-a(0)} {a(0)}
for all fluent names a in σ f l and 5. for every atom a that is an action atom of the language of l p T (D), the choice rules {a}.
Here we note that the language C assumes every action to be exogenous, whereas this is not the case in C +, where it has to be explicitly stated whether an action has this property. Thus, in (Babb and Lee 2013) rules of this group only appear for the case of actions that have been stated exogenous.
The simp T translation of C action description (3) consists of all rules of the form
On the Relation Between Programs l p T and simp T
Proposition 6 stated in this section is the key result of this part of the paper. Its proof outlines the essential steps that we take in arguing that two logic programs l p T and simp T formalizing the action language C are essentially the same. The key claim of the proof is that logic program
The argument of this claim requires some close attention to groups of rules in l p T (D) program. In particular, we establish by means of weak natural deduction that • the rules in group 1 and 2 of l p T (D) are strongly equivalent to the rules in group 1 and 2 of simp T (D) and • the rules in group 1 and 4 of l p T (D) are strongly equivalent to the rules in group 1 and 4 of simp T (D). Similarly, we show that • the rules in group 1 and 3 of l p T (D) are strongly equivalent to the rules in group 1 of simp T (D) and the rules structurally similar to rules in group 3 of simp T (D) and yet not the same.
These arguments allow us to construct a program l p ′ T (D), whose answer sets are the same as these of l p T (D). Program l p ′ T (D) is a conservative extension of simp T (D) due to explicit definition rewriting. Proposition 1 helps us to uncover this fact.
Recall that the language of simp T (D) includes the action atoms-the action names of σ act followed by (t) where t = 0, . . . T − 1. We denote the action atoms by σ act T .
Proposition 6
For a set X of atoms, X is an answer set for simp T (D) if and only if set X ∪ {-a | a ∈ σ act T \ X} has the form
We now state auxiliary lemmas that are useful in the argument of Proposition 6. It is constructed by uncovering the formal link between logic programs simp T (D) and l p T (D), where l p T (D) serves the role of a gold standard by the virtue of Proposition 5.
Lemma 2.1
If F is a formula containing a subformula G and F ′ is the result of replacing that subformula by G ′ then the sequent
is provable in N, where Γ is arbitrary set of assumptions.
Proof
Trivially follows from the Replacement Theorem I stated as Proposition 2 here.
Lemma 2.2
The sequent
is provable in N.
Proof
We illustrate the proof in N for the sequent
We allow ourselves a freedom to use De Morgan's Laws as if they were given to us as additional inference rules in N. Several applications of (∧I) will allow us to conclude the proof in N for the sequent in the statement of this lemma.
Proof of Proposition 6
It is easy to see 
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, for every dynamic law (2) in D.
It is easy to see that these sets of rules only differ in structure of rules (13) and (17) so that the atoms of the form l i (t + 1) (1 ≤ i ≤ m) in (13) are replaced by the expressions of the form not l i (t + 1) in (17).
Let Γ denote the set of rules from group 1 of l p T (D). Using Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 it is easy to see that the sequent 1 presented in Figure 4 is provable in N. It is easy to construct a proof in N from this sequent 1 to the sequent 2 in the same figure. This immediately concludes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2: The set of rules from groups 1 and 2 of l p T (D) are strongly equivalent to the set of rules from group 1 and 2 of simp T (D).
The proof for this claim follows the lines of a proof for Claim 1. 
Programs with Variables
We now proceed towards the second part of the paper devoted to programs with variables. We start by presenting a new running example and then stating the preliminaries. We conclude with the formal statements on a number of rewriting techniques.
Running Example and Observations
This section presents two ASP formalizations of a domain independent planning module given in (Gelfond and Kahl 2014, Section 9) . Such planning module is meant to be augmented with a logic program encoding a system description expressed in action language A L that represents a domain of interest (in Section 8 of their book (Gelfond and Kahl 2014) , Gelfond and Kahl present a sample Blocks World domain representation). Two formalizations of a planning module are stated here almost verbatim. Predicate names o and sthHpd intuitively stand for occurs and something happend, respectively. We eliminate classical negation symbol by • utilizing auxiliary predicates non o in place of ¬o; and
• introducing rule ← o(A, I), non o(A, I
). This is a standard practice and ASP systems perform the same procedure when processing classical negation symbol ¬ occurring in programs (in other words, symbol ¬ is treated as a syntactic sugar).
Let SG(I) abbreviate step(I), not goal(I), I = n, where n is some integer specifying a limit on a length of an allowed plan. The first formalization called Plan-choice follows:
success ← goal(I), step(I).
← not success.
One more remark is in order. In (Gelfond and Kahl 2014) , Gelfond and Kahl list only a single rule
in place of rules (20) (21) (22) . Note that this single rule is an abbreviation for rules (20-22) (Gebser et al. 2015) .
The second formalization that we call a Plan-disj encoding is obtained from Plan-choice by replacing rules (20-22) with the following:
← not sthHpd(I), SG(I).
It is important to note several facts about the considered planning module encodings. These planning modules are meant to be used with logic programs that capture (i) a domain of interest originally stated as a system description in the action language A L ; (ii) a specification of an initial configuration; (iii) a specification of a goal configuration.
The process of encoding (i-iii) as a logic program, which we call a Plan-instance encoding, follows a strict procedure. As a consequence, some important properties hold about any Planinstance. To state these it is convenient to recall a notion of a simple rule and define a "terminal" predicate.
A signature is a set of function and predicate symbols/constants. A function symbol of arity 0 is an object constant. A term is an object constant, an object variable, or an expression of the form f (t 1 , . . . ,t m ), where f is a function symbol of arity m and each t i is a term. An atom is an expression of the form p(t 1 , . . . ,t n ) or t 1 = t 2 , where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and each t i is a term. A simple body has the form a 1 , . . . , a m , not a m+1 , . . . , not a n where a i is an atom and n is possible 0. Expression a 1 , . . . , a m forms the positive part of a body. A simple rule has a form
where h i is an atom and Body is a simple body. We now state a recursive definition of a terminal predicate with respect to a program. Let i be a nonnegative integer. A predicate that occurs only in rules whose body is empty is called 0-terminal. We call a predicate i + 1-terminal when it occurs only in the heads of simple rules (left hand side of an arrow), furthermore • in these rules all predicates occurring in their positive parts of the bodies must be at most i-terminal and • at least one of these rules is such that some predicate occurring in its positive part of the body is i-terminal . We call any x-terminal predicate terminal. For example, in program 4. Predicate sthHpd never occurs in the heads of the rules in Plan-instance. In the remainder of the paper we will ground considered theoretical results by illustrating how they formally support the following Observations:
block(b0). block(b1). loc(X) ← block(X). loc(table
1. In the presence of rule (19) it is safe to add a rule
non o(A, I) ← not o(A, I), action(A), SG(I)
into an arbitrary program. By "safe to add/replace" we understand that the resulting program has the same answer sets as the original one. 2. It is safe to replace rule (21) with rule
within an arbitrary program. 3. In the presence of rules (18) and (19), it is safe to replace rule (20) with rule
o(A, I) ← not non o(A, I), action(A), SG(I)
within an arbitrary program. 4. Given the syntactic features of the Plan-choice encoding and any Plan-instance encoding, it is safe to replace rule (20) with rule (23). The argument utilizes Observations 1 and 3. Fact 4 forms an essential syntactic feature. 5. Given the syntactic features of the Plan-choice encoding and any Plan-instance encoding, it is safe to replace rule (21) with rule (24). The argument utilizes Observation 2, i.e., it is safe to replace rule (21) with rule (28). An essential syntactic feature relies on Fact 1, and the facts that (i) rule (20) is the only one in Plan-choice, where predicate o occurs in the head; and (ii) rule (24) differs from (28) only in atoms that are part of the body of (20). 6. By Fact 4 and the fact that sthHpd does not occur in any other rule but (26) in Plan-disj, the answer sets of the program obtained by replacing rule (22) with rules (25) and (26) are in one-to-one correspondence with the answer sets of the program Plan-disj extended with Plan-instance.
Essential Equivalence Between Two Planning Modules: These Observations are sufficient to claim that the answer sets of the Plan-choice and Plan-disj programs (extended with any Planinstance) are in one-to-one correspondence. We can capture the simple relation between the answer sets of these programs by observing that dropping the atoms whose predicate symbol is sthHpd from an answer set of the Plan-disj program results in an answer set of the Plan-choice program.
Preliminaries: RASPL-1 Logic Programs, Operator SM, Strong Equivalence
We now review a logic programming language RASPL-1 (Lee et al. 2008 ). This language is sufficient to capture choice, aggregate, and disjunction constructs (as used in Plan-choice and Plan-disj). There are distinct and not entirely compatible semantics for aggregate expressions in the literature. We refer the interested reader to the discussion by Lee et al. (2008) on the roots of semantics of aggregates considered in RASPL-1. An aggregate expression is an expression of the form 
(l ≥ 0) where each a i is an atom, and Body is the body in the form (31). When l = 0, we identify the head of (32) 
good(X) ← vtx(X), 2 ≤ #count{Y : e(X,Y ), e(Y, Z), red(Z)}
taken from Example 5 by Bichler et al. (2017) . This rule intuitively says that a vertex is good if it has at least two neighbors (vertexes connected by edge e) that, themselves, have a red neighbor. Variable Z in this rule is local to its only aggregate expression. Rules (21) and (22) have no local variables.
Operator SM
Typically, the semantics of logic programs with variables is given by stating that these rules are an abbreviation for a possibly infinite set of propositional rules. Then the semantics of propositional programs is considered. The SM operator introduced by Ferraris et al. (2011) gives a definition for the semantics of first-order programs bypassing grounding. It is an operator that takes a firstorder sentence F and a tuple p of predicate symbols and produces the second order sentence that we denote by SM p [F] . We now review the operator SM. The symbols ⊥, ∧, ∨, →, ∀, and ∃ are viewed as primitives. The formulas ¬F and ⊤ are abbreviations for F → ⊥ and ⊥ → ⊥, respectively. If p and q are predicate symbols of arity n then p ≤ q is an abbreviation for the formula ∀x(p(x) → q(x)), where x is a tuple of variables of length n. If p and q are tuples p 1 , . . . , p n and q 1 , . . . , q n of predicate symbols then p ≤ q is an abbreviation for the conjunction (p 1 ≤ q 1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ (p n ≤ q n ), and p < q is an abbreviation for (p ≤ q) ∧ ¬(q ≤ p). We apply the same notation to tuples of predicate variables in second-order logic formulas. If p is a tuple of predicate symbols p 1 , . . . , p n (not including equality), and F is a first-order sentence then SM p [F] denotes the second-order sentence
where u is a tuple of distinct predicate variables u 1 , . . . , u n , and F * (u) is defined recursively:
• p i (t) * is u i (t) for any tuple t of terms;
• F * is F for any atomic formula F that does not contain members of p; 3
Note that if p is the empty tuple then SM p [F] is equivalent to F. For intuitions regarding the definition of the SM operator we direct the reader to (Ferraris et al. 2011, Sections 2.3, 2.4) . By σ (F) we denote the set of all function and predicate constants occurring in first-order formula F (not including equality). We will call this the signature of F.
, where p is a tuple of predicates from σ (F). We note that a p-stable model of F is also a model of F.
By π(F) we denote the set of all predicate constants (excluding equality) occurring in a formula F. Let F be a first-order sentence that contains at least one object constant. We call an Herbrand interpretation of σ (F) that is a π(F)-stable model of F an answer set. 4 Theorem 1 from (Ferraris et al. 2011) illustrates in which sense this definition can be seen as a generalization of a classical definition of an answer set (via grounding and reduct) for typical logic programs whose syntax is more restricted than syntax of programs considered here.
Semantics of Logic Programs
From this point on, we view logic program rules as alternative notation for particular types of first-order sentences. We now define a procedure that turns every aggregate, every rule, and every program into a formula of first-order logic, called its FOL representation. First, we identify the logical connectives ∧, ∨, and ¬ with their counterparts used in logic programs, namely, the comma, the disjunction symbol |, and connective not. This allows us to treat L 1 , . . . , L k in (30) as a conjunction of literals.
For an aggregate expressions of the form
where y is the set of local variables in this expression, its FOL representation follows (20) and (22) in the Plan-choice encoding have the FOL representation:
The FOL representation of rule (21) is the universal closure of the following implication
The FOL representation of rule (34) follows
If we modify rule (34) in the following manner:
then Z is no longer a local variable. The FOL representation of this rule follows
We define a concept of an answer set for logic programs that contain at least one object constant. This is inessential restriction as typical logic programs without object constants are in a sense trivial. In such programs, whose semantics is given via grounding, rules with variables are eliminated during grounding. Let Π be a logic program with at least one object constant. (In the sequel we often omit expression "with at least one object constant".) By Π we denote its FOL representation. (Similarly, for a head H, a body Body, or a rule R, by H, Body, or R we denote their FOL representations.) An answer set of Π is an answer set of its FOL representation Π. In other words, an answer set of Π is an Herbrand interpretation of Π that is a π( Π)-stable model of Π, i.e., a model of
Sometimes, it is convenient to identify a logic program Π with its semantic counterpart (39) so that formal results stated in terms of SM operator immediately translate into the results for logic programs.
Review: Strong Equivalence
We restate the definition of strong equivalence for first-order formulas given in (Ferraris et al. 2011) and recall some of its properties. Lifschitz et al. (2007) show that first-order formulas F and G are strongly equivalent if they are equivalent in SQHT = logic -an intermediate logic between classical and intuitionistic logics. Every formula provable using natural deduction, where the axiom of the law of the excluded middle (F ∨ ¬F) is replaced by the weak law of the excluded middle (¬F ∨ ¬¬F), is a theorem of SQHT = .
The definition of strong equivalence between first-order formulas paves the way to a definition of strong equivalence for logic programs. A logic program Π 1 is strongly equivalent to logic program Π 2 when for any program Π,
It immediately follows that logic programs Π 1 and Π 2 are strongly equivalent if first-order formulas Π 1 and Π 2 are equivalent in logic of SQHT = .
We now review an important result about properties of denials.
Theorem 3.1 (Theorem 3 (Ferraris et al. 2011) ) For any first-order formulas F and G and arbitrary tuple p of predicate constants,
As a consequence, p-stable models of F ∧ ¬G can be characterized as the p-stable models of F that satisfy first-order logic formula ¬G. Consider any denial ← Body. Its FOL representation has the form ∀(Body → ⊥) that is intuitionistically equivalent to formula ¬ ∃Body. Thus, Theorem 3.1 tells us that given any denial of a program it is safe to compute answer sets of a program without this denial and a posteriori verify that the FOL representation of a denial is satisfied. This corollary is also an immediate consequence of the Replacement Theorem for intuitionistic logic for first-order formulas (Mints 2000) stated below.
Proposition 7 (Replacement Theorem II (Mints 2000) , Section 13.1) If F is a first-order formula containing a subformula G and F ′ is the result of replacing that subformula by
Rewritings 3.3.1 Rewritings via Pure Strong Equivalence
Strong equivalence can be used to argue the correctness of some program rewritings practiced by ASP software engineers. Here we state several theorems about strong equivalence between programs. Observations 1, 2, and 3 are consequences of these results.
We say that body Body subsumes body Body ′ when Body ′ has the form Body, Body ′′ (note that an order of expressions in a body is immaterial) . We say that a rule R subsumes rule R ′ when heads of R and R ′ coincide while body of R subsumes body of R ′ . For example, rule (19) subsumes rule (27). Subsumption Rewriting: Let R ′ denote a set of rules subsumed by rule R. It is easy to see that formulas R and R ∧ R ′ are intuitionistically equivalent. Thus, program composed of rule R and program {R} ∪ R ′ are strongly equivalent. It immediately follows that Observation 1 holds. Indeed, rule (19) is strongly equivalent to the set of rules composed of itself and (27). Indeed, rule (19) subsumes rule (27).
Removing Aggregates: The following theorem is an immediate consequence of the Replacement Theorem II.
Proposition 3.1 Program
is strongly equivalent to program
where G and H have no occurrences of variables in x i (1 ≤ i ≤ b), and F(x) contains no local variables.
Proof Indeed, consider the case when H is a disjunction of atoms then FOL representation of rule (40) is the universal closure of formula
The FOL representation of rule (41) is the universal closure of formula 1≤i≤b
Given that formula ∀z(H → H ′ )
where H ′ has no free occurrences of variables in z is intuitionistically equivalent to ∃z(H) → H ′ , the FOL representation of rule (41) can be written as the universal closure of formula
It is easy to see that the left hand sides of the implications in this formula and formula (42) are classically equivalent. And thus by Replacement Theorem II these formulas are intuitionistically equivalent. Similarly we can argue for the case when H is of the form {a}.
Proposition 3.1 shows us that Observation 2 is a special case of a more general fact. Indeed, take rules (21) and (28) to be the instances of rules (40) and (41) respectively.
We note that the Replacement Theorem II also allows us to immediately conclude the following.
Corollary 3.2 equips us with a general semantic condition that can be utilized in proving the syntactic properties of programs in spirit of Proposition 3.1.
Replacing Choice Rule by Defining Rule: Theorem 3.2 shows us that Observation 3 is an instance of a more general fact.
Theorem 3.2 Program
is strongly equivalent to program composed of rules (43), (44) and rule
Indeed, we can derive the former program (its FOL representation) from the latter intuitionistically; and we can derive the later from the former in logic SQHT = . For the second direction, De Morgan's law ¬(F ∧ G) → ¬F ∨ ¬G (provable in logic SQHT = , but not valid intuitionistically) is essential.
To illustrate the correctness of Observation 3 by Theorem 3.2: (i) take rules (18), (19), (20) be the instances of rules (43), (44), (45) respectively, and (ii) rule (29) be the instance of rule (46).
Useful Rewritings using Structure
In this subsection, we study rewritings on a program that rely on its structure. We review the concept of a dependency graph used in posing structural conditions on rewritings.
Review: Predicate Dependency Graph
We present the concept of the predicate dependency graph of a formula following the lines of (Ferraris et al. 2009 ). An occurrence of a predicate constant, or any other subexpression, in a formula is called positive if the number of implications containing that occurrence in the antecedent is even, and strictly positive if that number is 0. We say that an occurrence of a predicate constant is negated if it belongs to a subformula of the form ¬F (an abbreviation for F → ⊥), and nonnegated otherwise.
For instance, in formula (36), predicate constant o has a strictly positive occurrence in the consequence of the implication; whereas the same symbol o has a negated positive occurrence in the antecedent
of (36). Predicate symbol action has a strictly positive non-negated occurrence in (47). The occurrence of predicate symbol goal is negated and not positive in (47). The occurrence of predicate symbol goal is negated and positive in (36).
An FOL rule of a first-order formula F is a strictly positive occurrence of an implication in F. For instance, in a conjunction of two formulas (36) and (37) the FOL rules are as follows
For any first-order formula F, the (predicate) dependency graph of F relative to the tuple p of predicate symbols (excluding =) is the directed graph that (i) has all predicates in p as its vertices, and (ii) has an edge from p to q if for some FOL rule G → H of F • p has a strictly positive occurrence in H, and • q has a positive nonnegated occurrence in G. We denote such a graph by DG p [F] . For instance, Figure 5 presents the dependence graph of a conjunction of formulas (36) and (37) relative to all its predicate symbols. It contains four vertices, namely, o, action, step, and goal, and two edges: one from vertex o to vertex action and the other one from o to step. Indeed, consider the only two FOL rules (48) and (49) stemming from this conjunction. Predicate constant o has a strictly positive occurrence in the consequent o(A, I) of the implication (48), whereas action and step are the only predicate constants in the antecedent ¬¬o(A, I) ∧ SG(I) ∧ action(A) of (48) that have positive and nonnegated occurrence in this antecedent. It is easy to see that a FOL rule of the form G → ⊥, e.g., FOL rule (49), does not contribute edges to any dependency graph.
For any logic program Π, the dependency graph of Π, denoted DG [Π] , is a directed graph of Π relative to the predicates occurring in Π. For example, let Π be composed of two rules (20) (36) and (37) forms its FOL representation. Thus, Figure 5 captures its dependency graph DG [Π] .
Shifting We call a logic program disjunctive if all its rules have the form (32), where Body only contains atoms possibly preceded by not. We say that a disjunctive program is normal when it does not contain disjunction connective |. In (Gelfond et al. 1991) , Gelfond et al. defined a mapping from a propositional disjunctive program Π to a propositional normal program by replacing each rule (32) with l > 1 in Π by l new rules
They showed that every answer set of the constructed program is also an answer set of Π. Although the converse does not hold in general, Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter (1994) showed that the converse holds if Π is "head-cycle-free". Linke et al. (2004) illustrated how this property holds about programs with nested expressions that capture choice rules, for instance. Here we generalize these findings further. First, we show that shifting is applicable to first-order programs (that also allow choice rules and aggregates in addition to disjunction). Second, we illustrate that under certain syntactic/structural conditions on a program we may apply shifting "locally" to some rules with disjunction and not others.
For an atom a, by a 0 we denote its predicate constant. For example o(A, I) 0 = o. Let R be a rule of the form (32) with l > 1. By shift p (R) (where p is a tuple of distinct predicates) we denote the rule
Let P R be a partition of the set composed of the distinct predicate symbols occurring in the head of rule R. By shift P R (R) we denote the set of rules composed of rule shift p (R) for every member p of the partition P R (order of the elements in p is immaterial). For instance, if R 1 denotes a rule
then P 1 R 1 = {{a, b}, {c, d, e}} and P 2 R 1 = {{a, b}, {c}, {d, e}} form sample partitions of the described kind. Set shift P R 1 1
Theorem 3.3
Let Π be a logic program, R be a set of rules in Π of the form (32) with l > 1, and C be the set of strongly connected components in the dependency graph of Π. A program constructed from Π by replacing each rule R ∈ R with shift P R (R) has the same answer sets as Π if any partition P R is such that there are no two distinct members p 1 and p 2 in P R so that for some strongly connected component c in C, c ∩ p 1 = / 0 and c ∩ p 2 = / 0. 5
Consider a sample program Π samp composed of rule (51), which we denote as R 1 , and rules
The strongly connected components of program Π samp are {{a, b}, {c}, {d}, {e(1)}}. Theorem 3.3 tells us, for instance, that the answer sets of program Π samp coincide with the answer sets of two distinct programs:
1. a program composed of rules shift P (20) with (29) and (ii) adding rule (27). Theorem 3.3 tells us that programs Plan-choice ′ and Plan-choice ′′ have the same answer sets. Indeed, 1. take R to consist of rule (23) To prove Theorem 3.3 we recall the Splitting Lemma from (Ferraris et al. 2009 ) (this Splitting Lemma is the generalization of the Splitting Set Theorem (Lifschitz and Turner 1994) 
Proof of Theorem 3.3
We start by partitioning C into two sets Q and r so that • any element in Q is such that at least one of its predicate symbols occurs in a head of some rule in R, • any element in r is such that none of its predicate symbols occurs in a head of some rule in R. We identify set r with a tuple (order is immaterial) composed of the predicate symbols occurring in its elements. For set Q we identify every strongly connected component q ∈ Q, with a tuple of predicate symbols in this component.
By Π sh we denote a program constructed from Π by replacing each rule R ∈ R with shift P R (R). By definition, an answer set of Π is an Herbrand model of formula (39). Similarly, an answer set of Π sh is an Herbrand model of
We now show that formulas (39) and (53) are equivalent. By the Splitting Lemma, formula (39) is equivalent to
Theorem 5 from (Ferraris et al. 2011) shows that given formulas SM p [F] and SM p [G] so that π(F) = π(G) if the equivalence between F and G can be derived intuitionistically from the law of excluded middle formulas for all predicates in π(F)\ p, then they have the same stable models. Following claims are the consequences of that theorem
Consequently, formula (54) is equivalent to formula
It is easy to see that π( Π) = π( Π sh ). By the Splitting Lemma, formula (55) is equivalent to (53).
Completion We now proceed at stating formal results about first-order formulas and their stable models. The fact that we identify logic programs with their FOL representations translates these results to the case of the RASPL-1 programs. About a first-order formula F we say that it is in Clark normal form (Ferraris et al. 2011 ) relative to the tuple/set p of predicate symbols if it is a conjunction of formulas of the form
one for each predicate p ∈ p, where x is a tuple of distinct object variables. We refer the reader to Section 6.1 in (Ferraris et al. 2011) for the description of the intuitionistically equivalent transformations that can convert a first-order formula, which is a FOL representation for a RASPL-1 program (without disjunction and denials), into Clark normal form.
The completion of a formula F in Clark normal form relative to predicate symbols p, denoted
, is obtained from F by replacing each conjunctive term of the form (56) with
We now review an important result about properties of completion. 10 (Ferraris et al. 2011) ) For any formula F in Clark normal form and arbitrary tuple p of predicate constants, formula
Theorem 3.4 (Theorem
is logically valid.
The following Corollary is an immediate consequence of this theorem, Theorem 3.1, and the fact that formula of the form ∀(Body → ⊥) is intuitionistically equivalent to formula ¬ ∃Body.
Corollary 3.3
For any formula G ∧ H such that (i) formula G is in Clark normal form relative to p and H is a conjunction of formulas of the form ∀(K → ⊥), the implication
To illustrate the utility of this result we now construct an argument for the correctness of Observation 5. This argument finds one more formal result of use:
Proposition 3.2 For a program Π, a first-order formula F such that every answer set of Π satisfies F, and any two denials R and R ′ such that F → ( R ↔ R ′ ), the answer sets of programs Π ∪ {R} and Π ∪ {R ′ } coincide.
Theorem 3.1 provides grounds for a straightforward argument for this proposition.
Consider the Plan-choice encoding without denial (21) extended with any Plan-instance. We can partition it into two parts: one that contains the denials, denoted by Π H , and the remainder, denoted by Π G . Recall Fact 1. Following the steps described by Ferraris et al. (2011, Section 6 .1), formula Π G turned into Clark normal form relative to the predicate symbols occurring in Π H ∪ Π G contains implication (36). The completion of this formula contains equivalence
By Corollary 3.3 it follows that any answer set of Π H ∪ Π G satisfies formula (57). It is easy to see that an interpretation satisfies (57) and the FOL representation of (28) We now state the main formal results of this paper. The Completion Lemma for first-order programs stated next is essential in proving the Lemma on Explicit Definitions for first-order programs. Observation 6 follows immediately from the latter lemma.
Theorem 3.5 (Completion Lemma)
Let F be a first-order formula and q be a set of predicate constants that do not have positive, nonnegated occurrences in any FOL rule of F. Let p be a set of predicates in F disjoint from q. Let D be a formula in Clark normal form relative to q so that in every conjunctive term (56) of D no occurrence of an element in q occurs in G as positive and nonnegated. Formula
is equivalent to formulas
This result tells us that pq-stable models of F ∧ D are such that they satisfy the classical firstorder formula Comp [D] . These models also can be characterized as (i) the p-stable models of F that satisfy Comp [D] , and (ii) the pq-stable models of F extended with the counterpart of choice rules for member of q that satisfy Comp [D] .
In order to state a proof for Completion Lemma, we recall several important theorems from (Ferraris et al. 2009; Ferraris et al. 2011) . 
Theorem 3.7 (Theorem 2 (Ferraris et al. 2011) ) Let F be first-order sentences, and let p, q be disjoint tuples of distinct predicate constants. Then
We say that formula
Theorem 3.8 (Theorem 11 (Ferraris et al. 2009 For an interpretation I over signature Σ, by I |σ we denote the interpretation over σ ⊆ Σ constructed from I so that every function or predicate symbol in σ is assigned the same value in both I and I |σ . We call formula G in (56) a definition of p(x). Theorem 3.9 (Lemma on Explicit Definitions) Let F be a first-order formula, q be a set of predicate constants that do not occur in F, and p be an arbitrary set of predicate constants in F. Let D be a formula in Clark normal form relative to q so that in every conjunctive term (56) of D there is no occurrence of an element in q in G. 
Using this fact and Theorem 3.9 allows us to support Observation 6. Take F to be the FOL representation of Plan-choice encoding extended with any Plan-instance and D be the FOL representation of (62) 
Projection
Harrison and Lierler (2016) considered a rewriting technique called projection. We start by re-viewing their results. We then illustrate how the theory developed here is applicable in their settings. Furthermore, it allows us to generalize their results to more complex programs. Harrison and Lierler (2016) considered programs to be first-order sentence formed as a conjunction of formulas of the form
It is easy to see that the fol-representation of RASPL-1 rule without aggregate expressions comply with this form. We will now generalize the main result by Harrison and Lierler (2016) to the case of RASPL-1 programs.
Recall how in Section 3.2.2 we identify the logical connective ¬ with its counterpart used in logic programs, namely, not. This allows us to call an expression not a, where a is an atom, a literal. To simplify the presentation of rewriting in this section we will treat L 1 , . . . , L k in (30) as a set of literals. We will also identify body (31) with the set {e 1 , . . . , e m , not e m+1 , not e n } of its elements.
Let R be a RASPL-1 rule in a program Π, and let x be a non-empty tuple of variables occurring only in body of R outside of any aggregate expression. By α(x, y) we denote a set of literals in the body of R so that it includes all literals in the body of R that contain at least one variable from x. Tuple y denotes all the variables occurring in the literals of α(x, y) different from x. By α ′ we denote any subset of α(x, y) whose literals do not contain any variables occurring in x. By Body and H we denote the body and the head of R respectively. Let t be a predicate symbol that does not occur in Π. Then a result of projecting variables x out of R using predicate symbol u consists of the following two rules
For example, one possible result of projecting Y out of
using predicate symbol u is
Another possible result of projecting Y out of rule (63) using predicate symbol u consists of rule (64) and rule
Yet, another possible result of projecting Y out of rule (63) using predicate symbol u consists of rule
and rule (66).
We are now ready to state a formal result about projecting that is a generalization of Theorem 6 in (Harrison and Lierler 2016) .
Proposition 8
Let R be a RASPL-1 rule in a program Π, and let x be a non-empty tuple of variables occurring only in body of R outside of any aggregate expression and not in the head. If Π ′ is constructed from Π by replacing R in Π with a result of projecting variables x out of R using a predicate symbol u that is not in the signature of Π, then M → M |σ ( Π) is a 1-1 correspondence between the models of SM p,u [ Π ′ ] and the models of SM p [ Π].
This result on correctness of projection is immediate consequences of Lemma on Explicit Definitions presented here. We note that the proof of a more restricted statement by Harrison and Lierler (2016) is rather complex relying directly on the definition of SM operator. This illustrates the utility of presented theory, e.g., Lemma on Explicit Definitions, as it equips ASP practitioners with a formal result that eases a construction of proofs of correctness of their rewritings. Hippen and Lierler (2019) considered a rewriting technique in spirit of projection defined here. They describe two rewritings α and β -projections. For instance, replacing rule (63) with rules (64) and (65) exemplifies α-projection. Replacing rule (63) with rules (67) and (66) exemplifies β -projection. Proposition 8 provides grounds for a proof of correctness for these projections. System PROJECTOR described in (Hippen and Lierler 2019 ) implements these rewritings.
We now generalize the notion of a result of projecting x out of RASPL-1 rule R also when some variables in x occur in aggregate expressions.
Let R be a RASPL-1 rule of the form
Rule R occurs in a program Π. Let x be a non-empty tuple of variables occurring only in body of R such that no member of x is an aggregate variable of some aggregate expression. By β (x) we denote some set of literals in the body of R outside of any aggregate expressions so that it includes all literals that have occurrences of variables in x. By γ(x) we denote some set of literals in b ≤ #count{y : F} so that it includes all literals that have occurrences of variables in x. Let u be a predicate symbol that does not occur in Π. Then a result of projecting variables x out of R using predicate symbol u consists of the following two rules
u(z) ← β (x) ∪ γ(x).
where z denotes the variables that occur in β (x) ∪ γ(x), but do not occur in x. Recall rule (34). A result of projecting variable Z out of it using predicate symbol u consists of the following two rules 
By β ′ we denote all literals in β (x) that contain no other variables, but these occurring in x. If no variable in x occurs in any aggregate expression of Body, then we can simplify rule (69) as follows H ← b ≤ #count{y : u(z), F \ γ(x)}, Body \ β ′ .
For instance, recall rule (38).
good(X) ← vtx(X), 2 ≤ #count{Y : e(X,Y ), e(Y, Z), red(Z)}, good(Z).
A result of projecting variable Z out of it using predicate symbol u consists of the following two rules good ( 
t(Y ),t(Z),t(V ),t(S) u(Z, S) ← p(Z), q(Z,U), q(U, T ), q(T, S).
Another result of projecting variables {U, T } using predicate symbol u consists of the following two rules ← #count{X,Y : u(Z, S), f (V + 1,W ), X = 2 * W},t(Y ),t(Z),t(V ),t(S)
u(Z, S) ← p(Z), q(Z,U), q(U, T ), q(T, S),t(Z),t(S).
We are now ready to state a formal result stating that applying described projection technique results in a program that is essentially equivalent to an original one. We note that already mentioned system PROJECTOR implements rewritings on rules with aggregates as exemplified here. The statement below provides a proof of correctness for this system.
Proposition 9
Let Π be a RASPL-1 program, p be a set of predicate constants, and R be a RASPL-1 rule of the form Proof Let • β (x) be some set of literals in the body of R outside of any aggregate expressions so that it includes all literals that have occurrences of variables in x.
• γ(x) be some set of literals in b ≤ #count{y : F(y, y ′ )} so that it includes all literals that have occurrences of variables in x.
• z be the variables that occur in β (x) ∪ γ(x), but do not occur in x.
A result of projecting variables x out of R using u consists of the two rules:
The FOL-representation of R follows:
The LHS of the implication in (74) is classically equivalent to
Since y ′ consists of local variables, it is obvious that β (x) does not contain any variables in y ′ .
Also none of the variables y 1 · · · y b are in x. Thus, formula (75) is classically equivalent to
By Replacement Theorem II, formula (74) is intuitionistically equivalent to formula
Lemma on Explicit Definitions allows us now to conclude that M → M |σ ( Π) is a 1-1 correspondence between the models of SM p,u [ Π ′ ] and the models of SM p [ Π] . This is easy to see by considering the FOL representations of rules (72) and (73), and the relation between the FOL representation of rule (72) and formula (76). It is easy to see how a similar argument can be constructed for the suggested simplification.
Conclusions
We illustrated how the concepts of strong equivalence and conservative extensions can be used jointly to argue the correctness of a newly designed program or correctness of program's rewritings. This work outlines a methodology for such arguments. Also, this paper lifts several important theoretical results for propositional programs to the case of first-order logic programs. These new formal findings allow us to argue a number of first-order program rewritings to be safe. We illustrate the usefulness of these findings by utilizing them in constructing an argument which shows that the sample programs Plan-choice and Plan-disj are essentially the same. We believe that these results provide a strong building block for a portfolio of safe rewritings that can be used in creating an automatic tool for carrying these rewritings during program performance optimization phase. For example, system PROJECTOR discussed in the last section implements projection rewritings for the sake of performance. In this work we utilized the presented formal results to argue the correctness of this system.
